Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has been very successful as a mechanism for resolving environmental conflict in the United States. Although it has rarely been used in Europe, European social scientists still have high expectations of its potential to achieve consensual, fair solutions and, in so doing, to increase the general welfare. The promised outcome, it is hoped, can be accomplished through a cooperative procedure resting on extended participation, transparency and procedural justice. In the first part of this paper it is argued that the success or failure of ADR depends not only on the procedure itself, but also on exogenous factors. Three types of exogenous factor can be distinguished. First, there are exogenous restrictions to possible solutions: the opportunities for negotiated agreements depend upon the physical, technical and economic feasibility of potential solutions, as well as upon the law. Second, the course and the result of the negotiation is restricted by the best alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) of the disputants; these alternatives are mostly determined by external factors. Third, in collective bargaining the room for negotiation is also limited by political directives from the negotiator's constituencies or supervisors. The second part of this paper is devoted to a case study of the mediation in the waste management programme of Neuss County, Germany. This mediation attempted mainly to resolve a conflict over the siting of a waste incineration plant. It ended without consensus. It will be shown how exogenous restrictions, outside options and political guidelines influenced the course of the mediation, how they enlarged or diminished the negotiation space and, ultimately, how they determined the final outcome.
INTRODUCTION

S
ince the 1970s, there has been an observable increase in the number of environmental conflicts, as well as in their degree of severity, all over the Western world. At the level of basic decisions on alternative uses of the environment or the introduction of new technologies, the public debate has been characterized by growing fundamentalism and, increasingly, by violent confrontation.
Planning and development that impact the environment have more frequently become the targets of lengthy and tedious conflict. In the environmental policy arena, attempts have been made to find a way out of these problems by trying out new, cooperative forms of conflict resolution based upon negotiation and increased participation, such as policy dialogue, round tables, participatory technology assessment or mediation.
The so-called alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures were first employed in the United States. After the successful resolution by mediation of a highly publicized and difficult dispute over the construction of a river dam in 1973, the application of ADR increased steadily. It is now a common instrument for the dissolution of conflict over environmental policies as well as over land use and siting decisions. A similar development also occurred in Canada. In Japan, which has a long tradition in cooperative policy making, negotiation based procedures are widely used to resolve environmental conflicts, as well.
In Europe, ADR has only rarely been used (see Fietkau et al., 1998; Weidner, 1998) . Thus far most of the European experience with cooperative procedures has been acquired in Germany: from 1989 to 1998 some 100 ADR procedures took place in the field of environmental politics and policy. Generally, political actors resort to mediation or similar processes after the conventional procedures for conflict resolution have failed -that is, in the most difficult cases. Often such procedures end at least partially without a consensus. After an initial phase of great expectations, ADR is now considered less promising than had been hoped. In the United Kingdom there are a few small enterprises that carry out environmental mediation, but usually only minor conflicts are mediated. With the exception of land use conflicts, the UK is not usually witness to so many tough environmental disputes. Those that do occur are resolved primarily through a system of planning inquiries, which can be seen as a functional equivalent to ADR in the land use policy field. In Switzerland there have been a few cases of ADR applied to conflicts of cantonal or national interest -for example, in the field of nuclear waste disposal -but experts do not see mediation as an expanding instrument. Political culture in Switzerland is very cooperative and compromise seeking in general; the threat of a referendum forces politicians to negotiate and to take into account the preferences of minorities from the beginning. This, too, may be seen as a functional equivalent to ADR. Similarly, in the Netherlands, a participatory style of environmental politics is prevalent. The so-called target group approach requires that each important decision is negotiated with all concerned parties. This may explain why, in the presence of many and often salient environmental conflicts, no ADR can be observed. Only very few mediations have occurred in Austria; in general, they have been valued positively. The environmental frontrunner states, Sweden and Denmark, have not experimented much with ADR. In Denmark there are consensus conferences for the resolution of environmental conflicts of nationwide interest (e.g. genetic engineering). These are participatory procedures based on expert opinions and voting, but not on negotiations; participants produce a recommendation, not a binding decision. While some -mostly unsuccessful -cases of ADR have occurred in Italy, the rest of Southern Europe has not been involved with it at all.
The modest application of ADR in Europe stands in sharp contrast to the great hopes of social scientists and politicians. Cooperative procedures are usually tied to elevated expectations on all sides concerning increased participation, procedural justice and greater transparency. A rational, cooperative approach to a conflict should result in quicker, fairer, less costly and more consensual dissolution of conflict, as well as in increased public welfare. In this way, decisions taken by the state should find greater acceptance among the public, social integration should improve and efficiency of state action should increase significantly. The positive potentials of alternative dispute resolution procedures have been discussed by a number of authors, among whom are Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) , Hoffmann-Riem and Schmidt-Aßmann (1990) , Holznagel (1990) , Fietkau and Weidner (1992) , Gaßner et al. (1992) , Zilleßen and Barbian (1992) , Albin (1993) and Weidner (1993) . For more skeptical or critical views see the work of Amy (1987) , Bora and Dö bert (1993) , Bora (1994) , Holzinger (1994) and van den Daele and Dö bert (1995). According to mediation theories, like the so-called Harvard concept for successful negotiation (Fisher et al., 1991) , making positions more flexible and de-fundamentalizing them will be the result of process-internal factors. The procedure itself, however, will meet with limitations here. The actors' willingness to compromise, for instance, is not determined solely at the procedural level. Throughout the entire procedure, this willingness is influenced by factors external to the procedure. The course negotiations will take and the final results of bargaining are not matters determined just by behaviour 'at the negotiating table' but also by what goes on 'away from the negotiating table' (cf. Lax and Sebenius, 1985) . ADR procedures can be generally understood to be procedures in which the disputing parties voluntarily come together in an attempt to find a better solution or achieve a better result than they would have, had they done without such a procedure. This means that whatever individual parties believe they could have achieved without the procedure becomes of central importance.
Crucial for an actor's decision on whether to participate in the first place, whether to stay or whether to drop out, will be his or her expectations as to the 'best alternative to a negotiated agreement' (BATNA). Prescriptive negotiation theory directs the negotiation partners to examine their own BATNA and that of their opponent (see, for example, Fisher et al., 1991, 143 ff.) . To actually do so, however, remains the task of the individual parties or mediators. The ADR literature concentrates for the most part on what goes on inside the procedure itself. External influencing factors are usually not given any systematic attention. Lax and Sebenius (1985) constitute a notable exception: They analyse BATNA and its importance for negotiating power, and show how BATNA can be influenced by the negotiators. BATNA can, however, be influenced by the conflicting parties themselves only to a limited degree; it is determined in part by factors completely independent of the negotiating parties, such as legal regulations.
In the following the issues of how BATNA is constituted and how negotiations are influenced by facts, events and strategies 'away from the negotiation table' will be examined. By approaching the issue of barriers to negotiation from an 'outside' perspective it can be shown where the limits lie to successful negotiated settlement in environmental conflicts. In the following section, the BATNA concept is presented, considering the ways this concept can be applied to environmental policy conflict resolution procedures, and examining the possible forms of outside influences on ADR processes. In the next section, it will be illustrated how the actors' BATNA considerations, exogenous restrictions and political guidelines affected the procedure in the case of the mediation on the waste management concept for the county of Neuss in the German Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia.
EXOGENOUS INFLUENCES IN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The point of departure for the BATNA concept is the idea that the primary motive for seeking a negotiated solution is that the parties to a conflict anticipate a better outcome from such a procedure than they could expect without it; that is, they expect to gain from co-operation. It is easy to see that parties to a negotiation would not accept an outcome of bargaining that would be worse for them than their own idea of the 'best alternative to a negotiated agreement'.
2 Among the aspects dependent upon the best alternatives or the outside options are not just the conflicting parties' decision to participate in such a procedure or to drop out of it, but also their willingness at a particular stage in negotiations to make concessions, agree to a compromise or, in general, to demonstrate flexibility. The BATNA for a party is a significant determinant of his or her bargaining power (cf. Raiffa, 1982; Lax and Sebenius, 1985, 171 ff.; Fisher et al., 1991, 150) . A party's ability in an actual bargaining situation to push his or her own goals through is essentially dependent upon his or her outside options. The more attractive the outside options, the easier it is to forego further negotiation and therefore the greater the bargaining power. The negotiation partner whose optimal bargaining outcome and best alternative are closest together has the greatest bargaining power.
BATNA and negotiations between political organizations
ADR procedures in environmental politics are negotiations between political organizations. Negotiations of this type are different from negotiations between individual persons in two ways. First, in such procedures, the parties do not only negotiate on their own behalf as individuals, they also negotiate as representatives on behalf of an organization. The room for negotiation is limited from the very beginning by the goals set by the respective organizations or constituencies; important decisions require regular consultation with the constituencies represented. Second, in such negotiations, the participating organizations can be seen as self-interested political agents. Political parties, business associations, administrative agencies, public authorities or private companies, in addition to having concrete aims at the factual level of conflict resolution, also pursue political-strategic aims. A substantive goal, for instance, could be pushing through the construction of a waste incineration plant or, contrarily, preventing the construction of a waste incineration plant. Examples of political-strategic goals might be getting reelected for political parties and politicians, mobilizing public support for citizens' initiatives, increasing their lobbying power for business associations or maximizing profits and maintaining their entrepreneurial freedom for private companies. The relative importance of substantive goals and strategic goals for any given organization will vary according to the type of organization in question. For a citizen's initiative, for instance, whose aim it is to prevent the construction of a polluting industrial plant, this substantive goal is primary. For longer lived, politically centred organizations such as the established political parties or business associations, however, political-strategic goals could dominate.
BATNA considerations will include substantive as well as political-strategic goals. In addition to the advantages and disadvantages that result from a negotiated agreement or an outside option at the factual level, participation -or non-participation -in ADR procedures can incur specific costs or benefits that would make a significant difference at the political-strategic level. The costs and benefits of participation include, on the negative side, the time and resources it is necessary to invest in them and, on the positive side, acquisition of relevant information, the ability to mobilize support among constituents and greater possibilities to build up or expand information exchange networks. Over and above these, the willingness or unwillingness of an organization to take part in consensus oriented procedures can mean a gain or a loss in that organization's credibility among its clientele or the general public. For each individual case, the costs and benefits of participating must be weighed against the political-strategic implications of the alternatives to negotiating. This relatively complex assessment will not only be carried out by the participants before the outset of negotiations; it will also be revised continually throughout the procedure in order to determine whether or not continued participation is justified or whether dropping out might not make more sense. Throughout the procedure the occurrence of internal and external events makes continual revision of initial assumptions and basic decisions necessary.
Exogenous influences on negotiations
We can distinguish three kinds of external event influencing negotiations. First of all, changes can occur in the exogenous restrictions on possible solutions to a conflict. For instance, technical, economic or legal restrictions that determine the set of possible alternative solutions from which disputants can select can be eased, lifted or abolished or, conversely, tightened or added to.
Second, changes can occur in the outside options of some or all of the negotiation partners. The outside options for the participants in environmental ADR procedures are essentially determined by the constitution, the political and economic system and specifically tailored law. Basically the following alternative courses of action or outside options are conceivable:
resolving the issue by state-level parliamentary decision or local-level community government decision; resolving the issue by decision of an administrative agency with the legal authority to make such determinations; exercising the right of participation in administrative decision making procedures; exercising the right to have industrial activities approved or facilities licensed for operation; resolving the issue through litigation; exerting influence upon policymakers, lobbying; initiating a referendum; mobilizing public support or exercising illegal forms of protest.
In individual cases, circumstantial factors determine the availability and feasibility of the options. The respective political positions of the negotiation partners determine which alternatives for action are available and how strong or weak these options are. Negotiation procedures represent a situation in which every partner is basically endowed with equal rights but not equal power. Although balance of power within ADR procedures is frequently insisted upon, it is a demand that will remain unfulfilled so long as the negotiation partners do not have equal power outside the negotiations. Balance of power can only be achieved if the stronger party can be forced into a binding commitment wherein that party agrees to relinquish the right to take recourse to his or her best outside option. A state parliament or a local authority, however, cannot be forced to relinquish its own decision-making power in favour of a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, having decisionmaking power as an outside option does not imply necessarily superior bargaining strength. The right to litigate, for instance, or exercising illegal forms of protest often serves as de facto veto power for otherwise disadvantaged parties in ADR procedures, especially when litigation implies lengthy court proceedings or successive stages of appeal.
The third way in which negotiations can be influenced from outside is that a participant's room for negotiation may be restricted by the organization or constituency he or she represents. This is the case if one of the bargaining partners represents, for example, a regional subdivision of a larger association, authority or political party and is therefore bound by the main organization's directives or may not deviate from its basic principles. However, in the course of negotiations, such directives can be altered exogenously and basic principles can come under serious pressure as a result of bargaining itself. If such directives are factors in negotiations, then they imply that no negotiated solution should be accepted by the representatives of an organization that does not yield the minimum expected benefit for that organization.
Nevertheless, the strategic importance of a first credible commitment in the negotiation process should not be overlooked. As Schelling (1960, 22 ff.) has shown, the side that is the first to make a credible and irreversible commitment to a solution comes out ahead in a negotiated settlement, as long as this outcome is better than the BATNA of the opposing side. In this situation, the opposing side is left with only the choice to accept the proposed solution or to fall back on its own (worse) outside option. A directive from a negotiating party's next highest authority or constituency can serve quite well as a first credible commitment, especially if this directive reflects a well known basic principle of the respective organization. Here, the commitment can really secure a strategic advantage for a negotiating party, if the solution just reaches the level of acceptability of that party's opponents. However, if this is not the case, then such a commitment becomes no more than a vow to a strategy of head-on confrontation. If the solutions preset by organizational directives are less advantageous to the opponents in a negotiation than their own outside options, then negotiations collapse. In this situation, sticking to a fixed position is irrational, because one would then have to fall back on a substantially worse outcome than the negotiated settlement would yield.
In the following sections, the question of to what extent the mediation procedure over the waste management programme for the County of Neuss was influenced by outside factors will be addressed. The total set of outside influences will not be dealt with here in its entirety; rather, only some characteristic examples will be examined. First the disputants' decisions about whether to participate in the mediation procedure will be analysed; second and third, the exogenous restrictions and political directives will be looked at; both of these were highly significant for the mediation procedure and its final outcome.
THE MEDIATION PROCEDURE ON THE WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME IN THE COUNTY OF NEUSS, GERMANY
The dispute and the course of negotiation German law assigns the responsibility for the disposal of domestic waste to the counties. Neuss County is therefore required by law to develop a concept and implement a programme for the disposal of domestic waste and to regularly update this programme. The draft for the 1991 waste disposal concept in Neuss ignited a serious conflict that became the subject of mediation. The 1991 concept contained plans for a new waste incineration plant. The Neuss County Administration commissioned an expert report that proposed three possible locations to site this plant. On the basis of this report, the county authorities favoured one particular site. Long before its waste management plan had been approved by the county council, the concept met with vigorous opposition from the local population and local environmental associations. The Neuss County Administration signalled its interest in resolving this conflict through a mediation procedure; it contacted the Science Centre Berlin for Social Research (WZB); the WZB organized and accompanied the mediation procedure.
3
After an initial phase of preliminary talks held in the winter of 1991/92, a total of nine mediation sessions took place between 28 March 1992 and 27 August 1993. Altogether 27 organizations participated in this mediation: the Neuss County Administration, eight county community administrations, four political parties represented on the county council, five citizens' initiatives, the county-level environmental associations, business associations and two local churches. The waste management programme including residual waste incineration was basically supported by the Neuss County Administration, most of the county community administrations, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and three business associations. This group is referred to collectively as the supporters. The Green Party, the environmental associations, the citizens' initiatives, two local communities and the churches opposed the waste management plan, especially the proposed waste incineration plant. This group collectively constituted the opponents. Of the three proposed sites for the waste incineration plant, all the participants agreed that Grevenbroich-Neurath was the most likely to be chosen. The hard core of the conflict was determined by two factors: acceptance or rejection of waste incineration as a technology per se; and acceptance or rejection of the proposed site, Grevenbroich-Neurath. Actual negotiations were carried out primarily among 3 The information presented here is based upon direct observation of the mediation procedure by the WZB research team, upon a longitudinal and a final questionnaire and upon approximately 50 qualitative interviews conducted with participants in the mediation and with some other organizations impacted by the conflict. The results of the written survey and the interviews are presented in the work of Fietkau and Weidner (1995) , Pfingsten and Fietkau (1995) , Holzinger and Weidner (1997) and Holzinger (2000) . the following organizations: the Neuss County Administration, the SPD and the CDU, on the supporting side; the Greens, the German affiliate of Friends of the Earth, BUND, and the citizen's initiative against waste incineration, BIMV, on the opposing side.
At the last mediation session, the Neuss County Administration announced that it was about to present a proposal to the county council, in which a definite site for the incineration plant had been selected and would be recommended. The environmental associations, the citizen's initiatives and the Greens declared that they could not support this proposal and that they would stick to their demand that residual domestic waste be treated biomechanically. The remaining participants either supported the Neuss County Administration's position or abstained from the vote. The mediation ended without a consensus over the issue of residual waste treatment technology or over the issue of a site. Despite the remaining dissent however, consensus was achieved over a number of other factual questions including the introduction of more extensive waste avoidance and recycling measures (for details, see Holzinger and Lackmann, 1995) .
The decisions to participate
According to the BATNA concept, the utility for a participant in a negotiation must exceed the utility from dropping out and resorting to his or her outside option. In order to explain why the participants in ADR procedures decide to participate in the first place, it is necessary to examine their substantive goals and their political-strategic goals. For the Neuss mediation procedure, this information was gathered during the preliminary talks with the mediator 4 and during a first round of interviews conducted shortly after the mediation procedure officially convened.
The decision to participate in the Neuss mediation presented no problem for most of the organizations represented. The Neuss County Administration was the initiator; all of the organizations on the supporting side of the administration's proposal were interested in taking part. During the preliminary talks, however, the opponents of the proposal were at first sceptical. The BIMV was the easiest of the citizen's initiative groups for the mediator to convince to take part and, once this had been achieved, the others followed suit. When the BIMV was asked about their alternative to mediation, they indicated that the Neuss County Administration could reckon with litigation initiated by members of their group. A lawsuit would in any case achieve for them delay of the proposed project; in the worst case this would mean that the incineration plant would definitely be constructed, but at a later point in time; in the best case, its construction could be prevented altogether. The BUND's reaction to the idea of mediation was basically positive, but they pointed out that the costs in terms of time and resources were prohibitive for most of its members, who worked on an honorary basis. As its best alternative, however, the BUND feared that the waste management programme would be implemented in its present form. The BUND did not expect that their legal right to participate in the approval procedure (this is guaranteed under the German Nature Conservation Act) would have any significant influence on the final outcome. The strongest reservations against mediation were expressed by the Greens. They mistrusted the way in which the mediator was financed, they doubted his neutrality, they were unhappy with the exclusion of the press and not having the option to 'appeal to the public' and they feared what they assumed was the informational and tactical superiority of their opponents. Over and above this, the Greens were faced with a dilemma of basic principle: if they took part in the mediation, they would lose their status as 'fundamental opposition' -a situation considered 'dangerous for green politics and policy'. As their alternative to mediation, they named unconditional support for the citizen's initiatives and litigation.
For the Greens and the environmental groups the substantive goals were to prevent the construction of a waste incineration plant and to improve the waste management programme by providing and implementing a better, expanded concept of waste avoidance and waste recycling. For most of the county community administrations, the SPD and one of the business associations, the goal was acceptance of the waste management programme and construction of the waste incineration plant. In terms of the core of the conflict, supporters and opponents alike referred only to their maximum achievable goals: political acceptance of the construction of a waste incineration plant, for the former; preventing its construction and building a biomechanical waste treatment facility in its stead, for the latter. The expectations of the disputants concerning the outcome of negotiations corresponded directly to their uncompromising stance. Of the 27 organizations represented in the mediation, only three believed that a consensual solution was possible: one church, one city administration and one very politically inexperienced citizens' initiative group. All of the other parties to the mediation either did not believe that consensus could be achieved or they were unsure. Among those who declined to venture a prognosis were, notably, the Greens, the BUND and some of the environmental groups. This could suggest that these organizations did at least harbour some hope that they might indeed be able to influence the course and outcome of the mediation. Generally, in light of their substantive maximum goals concerning the waste incineration question and their almost unanimous expectations of irresolvable dissent over this issue, participation in the mediation by most of the organizations who did in fact do so would seem scarcely reasonable. It can be assumed, therefore, that the BATNA calculations yielded a negative result, when only the substantive goals were considered.
This picture changes, however, if we include the disputants' political-strategic goals obtained from our survey. The mediation offered the Neuss County Administration and the majority on the county council the chance to demonstrate their willingness to accept public participation in controversial matters, and the opportunity to try to achieve greater acceptance for their waste management proposal. The local communities felt that it was their duty to participate in a procedure that had been initiated by the Neuss County Administration and the county council. For the majority of participating organizations, a further motive for their interest was the opportunity to gain additional factual information about waste management in general and residual waste treatment technology in particular. On the opposing side, the most important strategic motives mentioned were that these organizations did not want to present themselves as incapable of submitting to consensus, that they wanted to establish additional contacts and that they wanted to buy time. These statements allow the conclusion that, for the actors in the Neuss mediation, the costs and benefits of participation in terms of their political-strategic goals and BATNA calculations were a highly significant factor.
Exogenous restrictions
In the course of the Neuss mediation the external conditions changed. This meant that some new alternatives became possible, while others were excluded. One such change was the passing into law of a new federal regulation, the Technische Anleitung Siedlungsabfälle (technical guidelines for domestic waste treatment) (TASi). The prevailing legal interpretation of this regulation is that the only residual waste treatment it allows, prior to waste being dumped, is incineration (Holzinger and Lackmann, 1995; Fietkau et al., 1998) . This meant that, compared to the situation at the outset of the mediation, the number of possible solutions had been reduced; and with that, the optimal solution for the opponents, biomechanical waste treatment, vanished from the spectrum of alternatives. The room for negotiation had shifted at the expense of the opponents. During the mediation, expert testimony was heard on the probable impacts of the new legal situation for waste treatment and disposal practices. Most of the experts agreed that, in the face of the new regulation, thermal treatment of waste could no longer be dispensed with, while others referred to possible exceptions to the rule and to 'periods of transition'. The supporters of incineration technology clung to the interpretation of the TASi by the first group of experts; the opponents stressed what they saw as the legal leeway inherent in the TASi, that they believed the County of Neuss could surely exploit if only it had the political will to do so. This was not a bad gamble for the opponents because the TASi was politically controversial and subject to renegotiation in the Bundesrat (the German Federal Council), up to 1995. This meant that the possibility existed that the incineration requirement provided for in the TASi could be eased. The TASi was rated by the participants in the Neuss mediation as the most important external factor of influence.
5
Another change that affected room for negotiations in the Neuss mediation was a newly developed waste treatment technology based upon the principle of high temperature carburation: thermoselect treatment. Thermoselect treatment fulfilled the technical requirements of the TASi and, at the same time, it promised to be very cost effective and to reduce the level of emissions significantly over those expected from conventional incineration techniques. Thermoselect technology attracted much public attention in the spring and summer of (see Der Spiegel No. 9, 1993 , and it was discussed in Neuss as well. Nevertheless, there was also much uncertainty and speculation about the performance and efficiency of this technology at the beginning of the mediation; at the end of the Neuss mediation, the majority of reports were, in fact, negative. This technology did, however, represent an additional possibility for resolution of the conflict, because it had the potential of being accepted as an alternative to conventional incineration technology -by the local community policymakers and the county government as well as by the environmental groups. In our interviews, BIMV and BUND rated the thermoselect technology as worthy of consideration, but this view was not expressed during any of the mediation sessions.
The waste management programme for the County of Dü ren in North Rhine-Westphalia and this county's dispute with the next highest authority, the district government, became a kind of reference model for the participants in the Neuss mediation. The 1991 Dü ren County waste management programme included a biomechanical waste treatment plant. Throughout 1991 and 1992, the president of the district government repeatedly warned the Dü ren County Administration that its plans to construct a biomechanical waste treatment facility in no way freed it from its legal obligation as provided for in the TASi to set up an incineration plant. The Dü ren County Administration, despite the warnings, would still not commit itself definitely to initiating a waste incineration project. The district government finally decided to initiate the planning and construction of the plant on its own -by decree. The Dü ren County Administration, in response, initiated court proceedings against the district government in August 1993.
The environmental groups, especially, but also the Neuss County Administration and the political parties represented on the Neuss County Council, had followed the developments in Dü ren intensely since February 1993. As a possible compromise solution to the Neuss conflict, some variation of the Dü ren model was in the back of the mind of everyone who was involved in this dispute. The revised waste management programme for Neuss could include the planning and construction of a biomechanical waste treatment facility and, at the same time, announce the planned construction of a waste incineration plant for some future point in time. In this way, the adversaries in the dispute could win time; they could wait for a final decision about the provisions in the TASi before actually proceeding with any plan.
Political directives
In the Neuss mediation, the conflicting parties did not come together. There were no explicitly stated, comprehensive proposals for compromise over the waste incineration issue. Up to July 1993, however, the Dü ren model stood as the 'virtual line of compromise' among the disputants in Neuss. From the interviews conducted in Neuss, a picture emerged suggesting that the BIMV, the BUND, the SPD, the CDU and the Neuss County Administration would have all been willing to accept a compromise like the Dü ren model; moreover, within the Neuss County Administration, it was also conjectured that the mediator favoured a solution of this type.
6 Nevertheless, at the final session of the Neuss mediation, no offer of compromise of this sort was forthcoming by any of the participating organizations. The Neuss County Administration suggested that it would submit an application to register a blueprint for a thermal treatment plant as part of the regional development plan, but that it would not specify the exact technology to be used, nor would any final decision on investment be taken prior to 1995. This meant that the authorities were in principle still open to thermoselect technology and that they were prepared to accept a delay in implementation; but obviously they did not want to go so far as to submit an application for a biomechanical waste treatment plant. The Greens and the environmental groups rejected the Neuss County Administration's proposal out of hand and the mediation ended in dissent.
Why was there no compromise in Neuss along the lines of the Dü ren model? For each of the groups involved in the Neuss conflict, the respective political directives and the outside options can provide some clues. The policy of the next highest waste management authority at district government level narrowed the parameters of negotiation within which Neuss County decision-makers could maneouvre. The district government, like the State Government of North RhineWestphalia, preferred incineration as the accepted technology in residual waste treatment. They did not consider biomechanical waste treatment a permissible option, and to plan it would have probably meant a court battle for Neuss County. Nevertheless, litigation would not necessarily have been imminent, since the higher waste management authorities can intervene only when continued waste disposal capacity is at risk. In Neuss, however, waste disposal capacity (available dumping space) was still guaranteed for a relatively long time. Nevertheless, as the county council representatives confirmed to us repeatedly in the interviews, it would have been politically difficult for county level policymakers to have taken any decision that would have run counter to the wishes of the higher authorities. Moreover, the Neuss County Administration and the majority on the county council (SPD and CDU) considered the situation and events in Dü ren relevant. Events there peaked at just the same time that the Neuss mediation reached its final phase. It became clear that Dü ren County's plans to reject a waste incineration plant would be thwarted by the district government.
Why, however, did the Greens and the BUND not respond to the proposal by the Neuss County Administration by appealing to the Dü ren model? Here again, political directives were relevant. The policy of the North Rhine-Westphalian state chapter of BUND and the state level Green Party was 'absolute rejection of waste incineration technology'. For the county level BUND and local level Greens in Neuss, therefore, it was not possible to give their consent to any form of waste incineration plant. In the case of the Greens, the policy line did not represent an additional restriction on the room for negotiation, because the Neuss county council faction of the Greens was also strictly opposed to incineration. The case of the BUND was different, because at least the local representatives in Neuss appeared to be more open to a pragmatic solution. Had the Neuss County Administration proposed the Dü ren model, the BUND representatives would have probably accepted that proposal. In fact, our interviewees from the BUND expressed a willingness to compromise vis-à -vis diverse alternative models. This was a result of mediation-internal processes. So, in one way the BUND representatives were disappointed at the conduct of the Neuss County Administration, but in another they were relieved that they had not been forced to violate the principles to which the state chapter of the BUND insisted they adhere. Possibly the BUND representatives were simply so surprised at the meagre proposal of the Neuss County Administration that they were not able to react immediately with a counterproposal.
In view of the above-described exogenous influences, it should come as no surprise that the Neuss mediation ended in dissent. The room for negotiation was so drastically narrowed by the political directives of those higher up in the respective organizations that no room for compromise was left. The TASi functioned as an exogenous restriction that changed the set of feasible options such that the opponents of incineration had practically no chance to attain their initial and foremost goal. Against this backdrop, it is all the more astounding that, despite the adverse underlying conditions, some convergence of ideas did take place and, at least for a limited time, a compromise did seem possible. In addition to mediation-internal events, two exogenous factors were crucially significant for this: the development of thermoselect technology and the Dü ren model as a frame of reference.
CONCLUSIONS
A general expectation that consensus should always be the outcome of ADR procedures is not justified. Our case study has shown that external factors can, in fact, set very narrow parameters for negotiated settlements. No negotiation or discursive procedure, regardless of how well it otherwise progresses, can overcome exogenous restrictions and better outside options. In order to guarantee the success of an ADR procedure, three external preconditions must be met. First, the exogenous restrictions may not be so tight that no solution would be feasible that is at the same time attractive to all of the negotiation partners. Second, the representatives of the conflicting parties must have enough room to negotiate. Third, there should not be structurally better alternatives to negotiation for the individual disputants.
The literature on ADR generally supports the contention that these preconditions must be met, if mediation is to be carried out successfully. There is nevertheless an inherent danger here that the truly hardcore cases of dispute would no longer belong to the set of negotiable conflicts. This stands, of course, in crass contradiction to the basic idea behind ADR, that it can resolve disputes that are otherwise unsolvable. There are, however, good reasons why ADR procedures should be invoked nevertheless, and why they can indeed be carried out successfully. These reasons stem from the fact that the BATNA calculations are difficult to carry out. As the analysis of our case study showed, it is not only extremely difficult to check all of the preconditions prior to the outset of negotiations, but it is never possible to control all of them. First, in negotiations between political organizations we must deal with actors who pursue not only substantive but also political-strategic goals. In the Neuss mediation, at the level of substantive goals alone, there was no area of agreement. Under those circumstances, according to the predominant view in ADR literature, the correct decision would have been to forego the mediation. Nevertheless, all of the actors in the Neuss case were prepared to participate because, on the level of political-strategic goals, the actors could expect to benefit by participating. Second, unforeseeable changes in the exogenous restrictions and the outside options are possible at any time in the course of mediation. In the Neuss mediation precisely this did occur: the set of feasible options changed as a result of the TASi, the introduction of thermoselect technology and the Dü ren model. Therefore, to forego ADR altogether, just because no consensus seems possible at first sight or at the level of substantive goals, would be rash and premature.
Thus the actors' political-strategic goals can, on the one hand, create additional opportunities to implement ADR procedures; on the other hand, actors' political-strategic goals can lead to additional problems. In environmental policy dispute resolution the participants are 'self-interested political agents'. They are bound by their respective organizations' directives and basic principles. In the case of the Neuss mediation, the political constraints placed upon the Neuss County Administration and the environmental groups reduced the room for negotiation so much that a consensual agreement became unattainable. The more strongly the participants in a negotiation are oriented towards substantive goals, and the less such a procedure is determined by political rationality, the more likely it is that consensual agreement can be achieved.
This does not mean, however, that ADR in environmental policy could not yield a better result than the conventional instruments for dealing with environmental conflicts. Negotiation activities and discursive potential can come into play whenever external factors leave enough bargaining space. Better control of emotions, more rational argumentation, greater flexibility of positions and willingness to compromise can be achieved, in principle, through substantive negotiation and discourse. In the Neuss mediation, the willingness to seek compromise on the part of BUND and some of the citizens' initiatives can clearly be traced back to internal procedural factors. Moreover, ADR procedures can have positive effects beyond consensual agreement, for instance, by contributing to a better political climate and increasing the transparency of decision-making processes. 7 The limits of ADR procedures are determined by the possibilities open to actors to influence the decisions through institutionalized legal democratic processes, and informal or public activity. Since ADR procedures are based upon voluntary participation, they can only come to a consensual solution if, for all of the participating actors, the options 'institutionalized processes', 'informal lobbying' or 'public forum' do not promise a better outcome. For a political actor, the chances to be successful without using ADR depend on the opportunities for action given by the constitution, the law, the political culture, environmental awareness of the public and so on. These factors, and especially the constitutional and institutional environment, vary substantially across Europe and North America. As mentioned in the introduction, peculiar features of the political system in some European states may provide parties to environmental conflicts with opportunities that are structurally better than relying on ADR. This may explain in part why ADR has been practiced in only a few European countries up to now. Another explanatory variable is the number of tough environmental conflicts, which, in turn, is a function of the severity of environmental problems, economic development and the level of environmental awareness. No dispute resolution is needed if there are no conflicts; and it is plausible that no ADR is needed if traditional conflict resolution works excellently or satisfactorily. Thus far, however, the small empirical basis does not allow us to draw any systematic conclusions about correlations between the use of ADR in Europe, on the one hand, and levels of environmental conflict or institutional conditions and features of political culture, on the other. 
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